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A B S T R A C T
At the dawn of the recent mining boom, James Ferguson has forcefully argued that new investors in Africa
develop a new capital-intensive mode of production within securitized enclaves, breaking with the tradition of
providing housing and social infrastructure to workers characteristic of large corporations in the 20th century.
This article aims to provide a more detailed analysis of changes in mining companies' spatial government
practices by retracing the genealogy of workers' camps in the Congolese copperbelt from the early 20th century
to the present day. Based on archival and ethnographic research, the article draws attention to transformations
in the camps' architecture and the political rationalities underlying them. What this historical exploration shows
is less the emergence of a new spatial government reflecting the globalization of neoliberal capitalism than a
series of gradual changes over a century that result from the adaptation of mining companies to local constraints
and correspond to the development, or re-organization, of various power strategies.
1. Introduction
At first glance, the tradition of mining companies providing housing to
employees appears to be a vestige of the 20th century. In North America
and Western Europe, mining company towns disappeared with the devel-
opment of state housing and welfare programs and the rise of the car in-
dustry from the 1920s onwards (Daunton, 1990; Crawford, 1995). In
Southern and Central Africa, where mining towns emerged later, they
continued to have a life of their own until the 1980s (Crush, 1993; Demissie,
1998; Home, 2000; MacMillan, 2012; Mususa, 2012). It was not until the
economic decline and political change of the last two decades of the century
that companies were pushed to progressively abandon these housing es-
tates. Regarding the investors who participated in the mining boom in the
2000s, Ferguson (2005, 2006: chap. 8) has argued that they develop a new
capital-intensive mode of production in enclaves exonerating them from the
obligation to provide housing and social services to employees. The rise of
neoliberal capitalism would bring about the end of mining towns.
As mining projects develop, however, some companies rehabilitate ex-
isting infrastructures (e.g. Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu, 2015) and/or or
start building various types of camp for their workforce. The most im-
pressive case of a new camp is probably in Kalumbila, in the Northwestern
province of Zambia, where FIRST QUANTUM MINERALS (FQM) is cur-
rently building a new ‘model town’ comprising houses, schools, sport
facilities, etc., for 100,000 inhabitants. Although geographically isolated,
the town is not strictly speaking within an enclave: it is open to newcomers
and visitors. This case, I think, calls into question the narrative of the end of
mining towns in the 21st century. At the very least, it invites a reflection on
the limitations of Ferguson’s enclave narrative, and a reconsideration of the
history of the spatial government of mining companies in Africa.
To look at the issue in a new light, this article takes as a case study not
Zambia’s new extractive frontier, but the Congolese copperbelt (the
Southern part of Katanga province) just on the other side of the border.
Apart from the fact that I am more familiar with this region, there are two
good reasons for this choice. First, Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK),
which monopolized the mining industry in this area from 1906 to 1966,
was the first to ‘stabilize’ its workforce from the 1920s onwards. Within the
framework of this plan, mining towns were constructed equipped with a far-
more developed social infrastructure than in Northern Rhodesia – at least
until the late 1950s. Second, drawing on Reno (2001), Ferguson (2006:
204–207) singles out the Congo in his discussion of newmining enclaves. In
this country endowed with natural resources but managed by a weak and
corrupt state, he argues that mining companies would be pushed to operate
in secure pockets of territory directly connected to the global market.
After a discussion of Ferguson’s enclave narrative, this article fo-
cuses on the history of worker camps in the Congolese copperbelt since
the early 20th century.1 Inspired by M. Foucault’s genealogical method
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.10.005
Received 28 June 2018; Received in revised form 8 September 2018; Accepted 1 October 2018
E-mail address: brubbers@uliege.be.
1 I will use here the word ‘camp’ in a generic way for all for the types of human settlements built by mining companies, even if camps took increasingly the form of
‘modern’ mining towns (or ‘cités ouvrières’ in French) from the 1930s onwards. In doing so, I follow ordinary language in the Congolese copperbelt, where people
continue to distinguish the orderly space of the ‘camp’ from the disorderly place of the ‘cité indigène’.
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and analytics of power (Foucault, 1993, 1971, 2004), each section at-
tempts to identify the mining companies’ political rationalities on the
basis of a close analysis of the transformations in the camps’ infra-
structure – these transformations being considered as ‘clues’, or ‘in-
scriptions’, of broader power strategies. The role of other actors in-
volved in this process such as workers, missionaries, or union leaders
cannot be examined in detail here. Although these actors held dis-
tinctive views about camps (see Fabian, 1971; Higginson, 1989;
Hanretta, 1999), their influence on their infrastructure and spatial or-
ganization was arguably limited.
Sources for retracing this political genealogy are uneven for the
different periods studied here. For the first half of the 20th century, rich
archival sources are available and have already been the subject of
several analyses (Fetter, 1973; De Meulder, 1996; Hanretta, 1999; see
also Fetter, 1976, Perrings, 1979, Higginson, 1989). This article ana-
lyses these sources from a different light, one which pays more atten-
tion to gradual changes in power strategies over the colonial period.2
From the Second World War onwards, historical records on camps are
scarcer. The few existing studies on the subject rely principally on oral
sources (Henks, 1988; Dibwe dia Mwembu, 2001; Rubbers, 2013).
Regarding the postcolonial period, my analysis will be mainly based on
my own ethnographic fieldwork in the camp of Panda, on the outskirts
of Likasi, between 2009 and 2012. Finally, the camps recently built by
new mining investors were visited during the past few years while
carrying out the [WORKinMINING] project – a comparative research
project on labour in the mining sector in Congo and Zambia funded by
the European Research Council's Consolidator grant programme
(n°646802).
2. From mining towns to extractive enclaves?
In the recent literature on extractive industries in Africa, mining
investments have been generally understood through the concept of
enclave. Depending on the approach, this concept has two different -
albeit connected - meanings. This article discusses the work of social
scientists who use it to describe the enclosed space(s) that mining
companies in the 21st century produce in the global South (Ferguson,
2005, 2006; Hönke, 2009a,b, 2010; Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu, 2015;
Kirshner and Power, 2015; Côte and Korf, 2018). This focus on the
mining companies’ spatial inscription is taken as a starting point to
reflect more broadly on their mode of governance, and their infra-
structural, social, and political embeddedness in the countries where
they are established. In political economy, by contrast, the word en-
clave does not refer to a material space delineated on a map, but to the
weakness of linkages – as measured through various figures – that
foreign mining companies develop with domestic firms in low-income
countries (Singer, 1950; Auty, 2006; Morris et al., 2012).3 In addition,
as they focus on inter-firm relationships, these authors do not pay much
attention to workers’ living conditions – as if outsourcing had no impact
on labour. They have accordingly not much to say about the history of
workers’ camps.
Among the social science studies using the concept of enclave, the
work of Ferguson and Hönke deserve special attention here – it deals
with cases from the Central African Copperbelt, their aim is to study
changes in the spatial government of mining companies over time, and
workers’ camps are included in their historical analysis. Ferguson’s
argument can be summarized as follows. During the last two decades,
Africa has witnessed a stark increase in foreign mining investments,
including in areas of so-called weak state government. If investments in
such areas have been made possible, Ferguson suggests, it is because
they take a new form, that of the securitized extractive enclave.
Following the model of offshore oil platforms, mining companies seek
to protect their production sites as fortresses insulated from their im-
mediate environment. Two main developments allowed for the emer-
gence of this more ‘oil-like’ model: the increasing mechanization of
mining, which requires less labour than in the past, and the global
marketization of private security services for protecting mining facil-
ities from external threats. For Ferguson, this enclave mode of pro-
duction contrasts that of large 20th-century mining corporations as it is
developed by more mobile private companies and thereby less em-
bedded in local society. The mining towns of the past made way for
pockets of extraction that are more connected to the global market than
to the national economy.
Formulated at the dawn of the mining boom (Ferguson writes in 2004),
this thesis has sparked several empirical studies which have highlighted the
work necessary to create extractive enclaves (Hönke, 2009a,b, 2010; Appel,
2012; Hendriks, 2013; Côte and Korf, 2018). These authors show that, in
order to isolate a pocket of production from the society where it is estab-
lished, companies must actively engage with various of social actors – in-
cluding local elites, surrounding communities, police forces, and so on. As a
result, extractive enclaves are inevitably more embedded in local society
than Ferguson’s thesis would suggest. The work of Hönke on the Congolese
copperbelt is a good illustration of this analytical shift. Following Ferguson,
she argues that the mining industry in this region has moved from a colonial
model, based on the control of the workforce in camps, to a new model,
centred on the securitization of mining concessions. In her view, however,
this new spatial government does not completely isolate mining operations
from the social and political environment in which they intervene, as it
involves – among other things – collaborating with the police, co-opting
customary chiefs, and financing development projects in surrounding
communities to transform them into a ‘protection belt’ (see also Welker,
2014). Even CSR is interpreted here as part of a broader risk management
strategy.4
Revisiting Ferguson’s enclave narrative as a locally negotiated
process is not sufficient, however. This article aims to take the critique
of this narrative further by considering the variety of spaces that mining
companies produce as well as the multiple political rationalities un-
derlying them. The problem is not that an analysis in terms of enclave is
misguided: As I will show below, it does highlight some of the broad
changes brought about by the recent mining boom in the Congolese
copperbelt. The point I want to make is that ‘enclave’ works as a
‘steamroller’ concept which tends to flatten the irregularities that can
be observed on the ground:
(1) It leads to obscure the various spaces that mining companies either
produce or contribute to produce. If mining companies are en-
tangled in multiple ways with local society, these relationships
create various spaces that cannot be subsumed in the enclave
concept in any simple way – that is, not only those highlighted by
enclave analysis such as the concession, the transport corridor, or
the community targeted by CSR programs, but also water/elec-
tricity networks, new urban areas, labour markets, and so on (see
Kesselring, 2017; Bryceson and MacKinnon, 2012; Kirshner and
Power, 2015).2 The analysis below is principally based on the publications of UMHK
medical doctors. I have also consulted the UMHK archives and the African
Archives in Brussels.
3When Morris et al. (2012; see also Bloch and Owusu 2012) announce the
end of the enclave, they do not mean that foreign mining companies no longer
operate inside securitized concessions. For them, the development of out-
sourcing in the industry creates new opportunities for increasing linkages with
local firms. Provided that a number of conditions are met, foreign mining in-
vestments can therefore become a driving force for regional development.
4 On the basis of what I have observed over the past decade, the capacity of
mining companies in the Congolese copperbelt to actually function as enclaves
needs to be reconsidered. Their security strategies prove to be highly inefficient
in preventing artisanal miners from entering their production sites. This ob-
servation indicates that the boundaries of mining concessions are more porous
than Hönke’s analysis seems to suggest.
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(2) The multiple power rationalities underlying the production of these
spaces is another related blind spot in enclave analysis. In this
perspective, all strategies follow a single overarching principle of
government (be it risk management, disentanglement, or neoliber-
alism) distinctive of mining capitalism in general. In doing so, it
fails to consider not only the variety of investors characteristic of
the recent mining boom (Lee, 2017), but also the multiple strategies
involved in the spatial government of mining companies.
(3) The historical narrative underlying enclave analysis is silent about
the gradual changes in mining companies’ spatial practices, em-
phasizing instead how securitized mining enclaves of the 21st
century mark a rupture with the past. In addition, this great divide
is based on a myopic or asymmetrical reading of history that does
not focus on the same spaces in the past and present: Ferguson and
Hönke, for example, claim that mining towns have given place to
securitized enclaves without providing much details about how
mine sites were secured in the past or how workers are housed
today.
To bring to light the irregularities overlooked in enclave analysis,
the spatial government of mining companies requires a more micro-
level study. This is the aim of this article. In space, it takes as a point of
departure not the enclave as an abstract space governed by a principle
of closure but one of the concrete sites that mining companies create:
the workers’ camp. In time, rather than highlighting one great trans-
formation at the turn of the 21st century, it seeks to identify the suc-
cessive changes through which such camps have gone from the begin-
ning of the 20th century to present. Finally, these changes are
understood not only as a reflection of the general development of
mining capitalism in the Congolese copperbelt, but also as the product
of a range of political rationalities that stem from mining companies’
adaptation to local circumstances.
3. First camps (1906–1923)
As a type of human settlement, workers’ camps are characteristic of
the mining frontier. Over the course of history, however, they have
taken many different forms. The challenge here is to identify the pro-
cesses accounting for the specific forms that camps took in Katanga in
the early 20th Century. In the first decade of its existence, UMHK was
confronted with serious technical and logistical problems. To be prof-
itable, it prioritized the development of rich ore bodies near the surface
using labour-intensive techniques. Since Katanga was isolated and
sparsely populated, it adopted the migrant labour system develop by
South African mining companies; contractors recruited workers from
afar and drove them to Southern Katanga for a period of six to twelve
months. This system, or mode of recruitment, was intended to provide
UMHK with a large and cheap workforce.
At that time, Katanga province was administered by a chartered
company, the Comité Spécial du Katanga (CSK). Like the British South
Africa Company (BSAC) in Northern Rhodesia, it imposed limits on the
duration of work contracts to prevent depopulation in rural areas. This
limitation notwithstanding, the CSK was keen to assist UMHK recruiters
without paying much attention to how they treated workers. In those
days, the labour policy of the Belgian colonial administration was
‘liberal’ in the sense that it viewed industrial development as a matter of
public interest that required strong state support (see Ewald, 1996:
75–87).
Situated near UMHK mines and plants, workers’ camps were com-
posed of rows of straw, mud, or iron sheet huts, each of which housed
up to six people. Communal facilities, located at regular intervals in the
camp, included kitchens, showers and wash houses. Likely written by
the head of a camp in 1924, an anonymous and non-dated document
entitled ‘Overview of the general organization of a camp’ (Anon., n.d.)
that I found in the African Archives in Brussels provides a unique in-
sight into how such camps were designed and administered in those
days. The author makes no secret that the choice to build camps with
temporary materials is justified by the need to maintain the lowest costs
possible. Such camps, he argues, also suit the workers themselves: They
would prefer straw huts, as they are similar to those found in their
villages, and, since they only stay for short periods of time, they would
not care too much about their housing conditions anyway.
Built as barracks, UMHK camps were subjected to the autocratic
power of a European man imposing military discipline on the workers.
According to the author of the ‘Overview’ mentioned above, ‘the best
way to look after its boys and to increase their performance is to treat
them like soldiers’. Accordingly, former White soldiers with a colonial
experience were ‘prime candidates’ for fulfilling the job of head of
camp. Among other personal ‘qualities’, he must have an ‘instinct of
command’ to manage the workers ‘with firmness but also with equity
and benevolence’. Although an ordinance of 1922 banned the use of
‘chicotte’ (a small whip) on Africans, the head of the camp could still
make his ‘capitas’ slap a worker as a form of ‘paternal thrashing’.
The camps built between 1906 and 1923 not only responded to the
need to provide low-cost housing to migrant workers, their design also
increasingly considered the ‘resistance’ of workers as vulnerable bodies
and subjects who could escape from work in the mines. Very early on,
UMHK’s medical service found that workers’ camps were favourable to
the development of various diseases, particularly pneumonia, dysen-
tery, and typhoid fever. These caused high mortality and desertion
rates, and discouraged workers to extend or renew their contract. To
improve hygiene conditions, the service pushed the company to ex-
periment with different plans, house types, and building materials
(Mouchet and Pearson, 1922). While their inspiration came from South
Africa, company doctors sought out the formula most appropriate to the
conditions found in Southern Katanga (in terms of cost, climate, health
issues, etc.). In 1922, for instance, the UMHK built hostels on the model
provided by a South African expert, but adapted them to contain 14
beds instead of 48.
Under the influence of the company’s medical service, the military
discipline imposed in the camps was gradually subjected to a biopoli-
tical imperative. A fence was erected around the camps not to keep
workers in (they could get out freely) but to prevent them from defe-
cating in the bush: This practice attracted flies, a vector of typhoid
fever, the main cause of mortality death in the camps after pneumonia
(Mouchet and Pearson, 1922: 32; 74). Even in the daily management of
camps, growing emphasis was put on health surveillance to the point
that the morning roll call, the quintessential ritual of camp life, was
turned into an opportunity for giving hygiene lessons and identifying
sick workers.
The results of this biopolitical strategy, however, were dis-
appointing. In the early 1920s, despite the measures taken to improve
living conditions in the camps, death, desertion, and turn-over rates
remained high. As the medical service saw it, the problem was that this
strategy was not applied on a fixed ‘population’, but instead had to
tackle the constant flows of new migrant workers. It is this observation
that led the UMHK to set up a ‘stabilization’ policy and build new camps
in the 1920s.5
4. A eugenic project (1922–1933)
In the 1920s, the UMHK launched a new policy aimed at stabilizing
its workforce near production sites in the copperbelt. Thanks to an in-
flux of fresh capital from Belgium at the end of the First World War, it
embarked on an ambitious program of industrialization that required a
5 Provisional camps did not disappear from the landscape until the end of the
1930s. Brick houses were built progressively, starting with camps in the major
mining and industrial centers. In addition, for developing small distant mines,
UMHK continued to hire contractors who housed their workers in temporary
settlements.
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larger and better disciplined workforce. The simultaneous rise of the
mining industry in Northern Rhodesia and extension of the railway
network in Congo, however, led to increasing competition between
employers. Both the British and the Belgian colonial authorities im-
posed restrictions on recruitment in rural areas for the Congolese mines.
To overcome this labour shortage, the UMHK was authorized to orga-
nize its own recruitment missions in other provinces of the Congo and
Ruanda-Urundi and to extend its work contracts to three years. At the
same time, it encouraged workers to come in the mines with their wives
and children. It was expected that their presence would encourage
workers to stay for longer periods, while also enabling the company to
supervise the growth and education of their descendants.
Stabilization led to several changes in the built environment of the
UMHK camps. The organization of recruitment missions resulted in the
erection of new temporary camps in rural areas to gather, convey, and
prepare workers before their integration into permanent camps in
Katanga. In these latter camps, brick houses with an iron or cement roof
were built for married workers. From 1930 onwards, the most common
type of house included four rooms: a bedroom for parents, another for
the children, a veranda and a kitchen. Finally, to take care of children,
the company built nurseries, canteens and schools, and entrusted their
management to Belgian catholic orders, who came to play a central role
in the daily social life of camps.
In a sense, UMHK’s new policy consisted of implementing the re-
commendations of its medical service: recruiting married workers,
building brick houses, limiting the number of beds per room, among
others. While it had been deaf to such recommendations for a long time,
the company now had sufficient capital to implement them.
Stabilization also gave the early biopolitical project of its medical ser-
vice a much stronger twist. Its aim was to raise a ‘population’ in its
camps to create a new ‘race’ of industrial workers, cut from its rural
roots (De Meulder, 1996; see also Murard and Zylberman, 1976).6 With
stabilization, UMHK was not managing flows of anonymous workers
anymore, but maintained a stock of selected individuals, each of them
representing a form of ‘capital’. In these conditions, the company could
not be satisfied with a general knowledge about the robustness of
African ‘races’ and their ability to adapt to Katanga’s climate (see
Mouchet and Pearson, 1922). It required a more detailed knowledge
about individuals’ health and behavior (see Van Nitsen, 1933). New
recruits were to be subjected to regular medical exams, and complete
records were maintained on them and their family.
This eugenic project is nowhere more visible than in the recruiting
practices and the care provided to workers’ wives and children. Led by
doctors, recruitment missions sought out candidates for work in the
mines using a ruggedness test (Clignet) for the workers and pelvic
measurements for women (Van Nitsen, 1933). Successful candidates
were sent (alone or accompanied with their wife) to a concentration
camp, and then to a preparation camp, where they were vaccinated,
dressed, and fed for several weeks. Once in the copperbelt, new recruits
still had to stay in an acclimatization camp to once again strengthen
their body, and learn the basics of industrial work discipline (handling
tools, obeying to orders, resisting to long work hours, etc.). In the final
camps, near mines and plants, the medical staff sought to stimulate
workers’ reproduction by different means (Mottoulle, 1931; see Hunt,
1988). During post-natal consultations, mothers were pushed to shorten
the period of breastfeeding in order to increase their fertility. To reduce
infant mortality, it was compulsory that children above five years-old
had to eat in a specialized canteen, under the supervision of Catholic
missionaries.
The space of camps itself was reorganized in accordance with the
company’s new biopolitical strategy. Their access was put under a tight
control to limit contacts between ‘stabilized’ workers and others—be
that contract workers, Africans living at the ‘cité’,7 or fellow tribal
members.8 Within camps, workers from different ‘tribes’ came to be
progressively mixed from 1931 onwards. Although this measure was
initially aimed to avoid conflicts, it contributed to a blurring of tribal
affiliations and triggered the emergence of a new community, the
‘Union minière family’. At the same time, this community was divided
along new lines. Quarters for married workers were built separately
from those for single workers, and comprised different types of house
depending on the number of children. In addition, specific spaces were
now assigned to men, women, and children. This new ‘art of distribu-
tion’ was above all aimed at controlling workers’ sexuality and heredity.
It also sketched out the family policy that UMHK would develop in the
following decades.
5. A social government (1934–1960)
In the aftermath of the Great Depression, stabilization policy came
to be viewed as a success and the labour shortage was no longer a
problem (Mottoulle, 1946; Toussaint, 1956). The UMHK was mechan-
izing its operations and expanding its activities, and the challenge was
no longer an issue of increasing its African workforce but how to train it
in order to raise its productivity and replace Whites in semi-skilled
positions. To meet this goal, the company introduced a new job clas-
sification in the mid-1930s, which offered workers various advantages
depending on different criteria, including professional qualification,
length of service, disciplinary record, and level of ‘civilization’.
At another level, to solve the ‘problems’ caused by industrialization
and urbanization, colonial authorities gradually established a social
policy aimed at controlling access to the city, moralizing family life,
and promoting workers’ rights. In the aftermath of the Second World
War, laws regulating such matters increased rapidly.9 In order to quell
popular discontent and respond to criticisms internationally, the colo-
nial administration also conceived a ten-year development plan that
would involve building of new houses, hospitals, schools, community
centres, and so on (Vanthemsche, 1994; see Cooper, 1996). Caught in
the movement, UMHK not only complied with new social regulations, it
sought to remain one step ahead of colonial policy by creating new
social infrastructures in the camps, funding large community develop-
ment programs, and promoting social science research (see Rubbers and
Poncelet, 2015).10 Its ambition was to create ‘model’ company towns
under the tropics – an aspiration that gave rise to other similar ex-
periments in the Congo during the colonial period (see Hendriks, 2013;
Walker, 2014; Henriet, 2016).
These changes had a considerable impact on the UMHK camps.
6 This eugenic project was part of a more global trend in the interwar period
(see Bashford and Levine 2010).
7 Since the late 1920s, colonial authorities discerned in mining towns the
existence of a ‘detribalized’ population who had supposedly cut off its rural
roots. They decided to house this population in a ‘centre extra-coutumier’, or ‘cité
indigène’, with autonomous powers vis-à-vis customary chiefs. Although for-
mally independent, in practice the ‘cité’ remained under colonial administra-
tion’s control.
8Walker (2017; see also 2014) suggests that this concern to create ‘islands of
health’ was found in different parts of the colony, and that it was conveyed
through epidemiological metaphors of infection and contamination.
9 Authorization of trade unions and work councils (1946), prohibition of
polygamy (1949), increase of the minimum house surface (1949), compensa-
tion for work accidents (1949), creation of the labour inspection (1950), gen-
eralization of family allowances (1951), introduction of paid holidays (1954),
medical care of the family by the employer (1954), limitation of the working
day to eight hours (1957), and so on.
10 As the company works council’s minutes show, some of the improvements
brought to camps’ infrastructure have been claimed by workers’ representatives
rather than deliberately granted by management. Established immediately after
the law authorizing trade unions was passed in 1946, the Conseil Indigène
d’Entreprise at UMHK was composed of workers appointed by the employer. The
role of these representatives was to voice workers’ concerns, which most often
had to do with their salary and their living conditions.
B. Rubbers Geoforum xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
4
Quarters for single workers slowly disappeared to give place to family
houses with a small garden along tree-lined avenues. Each quarter was
characterized by a house of two to five rooms (a living room, a kitchen
and separate bedrooms for parents, boys and girls). The allocation of
houses no longer depended on the size of the family alone, but also on
the worker’s category in the job classification. In the 1950s, UMHK even
gave housing allowances to top-ranked workers (teachers, nurses, and
skilled workers) to stay in the ‘cité’. Formerly based on a simple division
between married and single workers, camp space was used to facilitate
a more complex hierarchy founded on biopolitical, professional and
cultural criteria from the 1930s onwards.
After the Second World War, camps were also equipped with
theatres, recreational facilities, and community and youth centres.
Taken together, recreational activities were intended to fight idleness,
impose new practices and values, keep camp residents under control,
and foster attachment to the ‘Union minière family’. They played a role
in the emergence of a more ‘total’ disciplinary regime (Fetter, 1973),
the aim of which was no longer to reproduce the workforce but to
mobilize it, to increase its productivity. From a biopolitical govern-
ment, the UMHK had moved to a social government functioning
through the multiplication and intensification of disciplines.
A key role in this new disciplinary device was assigned to commu-
nity centres (foyers sociaux). In these centres, white women offered
lessons to the workers’ wives in cooking, sewing, childcare, etc., and
inspected each household in the camp. Such control was particularly
strict for top-ranked workers: Social workers checked that the beds
were made, that the table was properly set, or that children were clean.
If the report was positive, the worker was rewarded. If not, the com-
pany sanctioned him. The purpose was to teach women the basics of
domesticity and, accordingly, create ‘modern’ families – that is, nuclear
families, characterized by a clear division of roles, in the image of the
company’s social order (see Rubbers, 2015b).
6. Nationalization (1960–1975)
In the years following Mobutu’s rise to power in 1965, UMHK and
its subsidiary companies were nationalized and merged into a large,
state-owned company, the Générale des Carrières et des Mines (GECA-
MINES). To benefit from the high copper prices on the global market, it
increased production and started a new industrial development plan.
Together with the Africanization of managerial staff, this expansion of
activities led to a rapid increase in the workforce. Although confronted
to growing inflation, GECAMINES workers continued to have higher
living standards than the rest of the population, largely due to the
various services the company provided in its camps. At the same time,
the Mobutu regime granted GECAMINES mining concessions to two
international consortiums that created the Société de Développement
Industriel et des Mines du Zaïre (SODIMIZA) and the Société Minière de
Tenke-Fungurume (SMTF). Although both mining projects developed
rapidly, they faced economic difficulties that pushed foreign investors
to withdraw from the Congo in the second half of the 1970s.
Contrary to what one might think, the construction of workers’
camps did not end with decolonization. If STMF only built a pre-
fabricated camp for expatriates, SODIMIZA erected two new mining
towns on the model provided by UMHK. On the other side of the
country, a new company town also rose from the ground next to the
Maluku metallurgic plant, one of the ‘white elephants’ of the Mobutu
regime (see Verhaegen, 1985). These newly constructed towns con-
veyed a claim of national modernity, continuing late colonial devel-
opment programs under a new guise (Ferguson, 2006: 161; Appel,
2012: 455).
The GECAMINES also modernized the camps inherited from UMHK.
All houses were equipped with electricity, a water tap, and latrines. For
the growing number of skilled workers, hundreds of new houses with
indoor toilets and bathrooms were built. Technical and secondary
schools were erected near the camps to facilitate the workers’ children
direct access to managerial positions. The modernization of camps,
however, was insufficient to overcome the shortage of housing caused
by the increased workforce. Freshly recruited (or transferred) em-
ployees had to live temporarily in a smaller house than they were en-
titled to, or stay in a camp far from their workplace. As a result, camps
progressively became overcrowded in the 1970s.
Independent of the modernization and overcrowding of camps, the
most important change that occurred in the years following
Independence was the progressive relaxation of the company’s control:
no more curfews at night, no more gates and guards at camps’ entrance,
no more restrictions on household composition and no more inspection
visits by social workers. This liberalization of camp life rapidly under-
mined the family policy that UMHK had pursued in the colonial period.
Workers were now free to go out in the ‘cité’ at night, to take a second
wife or to host relatives at home. Although courses in various domestic
skills were still organized in community centres, they attracted much
less women than they had in the past.
The presence of the state, in return, strengthened with the rise of the
Mobutu regime. A new administrative structure, as well as various
political bodies, was established in the camps to control and mobilize
the workers (Henk, 1988: 51–58; 179–185). In the new organization,
the head of camp, who remained company employee, was also the local
representative of the state administration and president of the single
party. Compared to UMHK in the past, the control exercised by the state
was less oriented towards the imposition of disciplines through the
spatial device of the camp than towards the maintenance of its sover-
eign power through policing and political rituals (Foucault, 1993;
Mbembe, 2001). It no longer sought to increase bodies’ (re-)productive
powers, but to have them participate in performances of loyalty and
grandeur.
7. Decline (1976–2004)
In the course of the 1970s, GECAMINES – SMTF and SODIMIZA as
well – was confronted with adverse economic conditions that put its
development plans in jeopardy. Additionally, to circumvent the budget
restrictions imposed by international financial institutions, the Mobutu
regime started to divert its revenues for political purposes. In the 1980s,
pushed to increase production at any cost to meet the regime’s growing
demands, the company was unable to renew or maintain its machines
and facilities. It is this vicious circle that led to its rapid decline in the
early 1990s: Production collapsed and in default of payment, GECA-
MINES had to cut costs on all fronts. While it did not dismiss workers, it
lost one third of its workforce after political militias forced Kasaïans to
leave Katanga province in 1992–1993. The remainder – some 24,000
workers – saw its purchasing power dissipate as a result of hyperin-
flation and the benefits offered by the company were progressively cut.
GECAMINES resorted to various strategies to resume production. It
solicited loans from foreign traders to put money into production, it
signed joint-venture contracts with foreign private investors and, in
1998, when GECAMINES was pushed to hand over mines for artisanal
mining, it also became involved in this trade with the support of local
businessmen. None of these strategies were, however, successful, as
profits generated by these financial arrangements were systematically
embezzled. In 2003, at the instigation of the World Bank, the state-
owned company was restructured: its main mining and industrial assets
were transferred to private investors, and its workforce was reduced
from 24,000 to 14,000 employees.
At first glance, the long decline of GECAMINES in the last two
decades of the 20th century led to a severe deterioration of its camps.
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Due to a lack of maintenance, buildings fell into decay, roads collapsed,
electricity was cut off, water pipes leaked, and vegetation covered open
spaces. Unable to house all its employees, the company assigned them
offices or classrooms that they converted into makeshift dwellings. In
addition, confronted by a severe decline in their living conditions, camp
residents pilfered goods from the company to equip their house or re-
sell them on the market.11 Today, the GECAMINES camps appear as
ghosts of a bygone era, abandoned to the erosion of time for more than
thirty years.
As my research on the camp of Panda (Rubbers, 2013) shows, this
general deterioration of the built environment conceals subtler changes.
First, the social life of camp residents progressively shrank after the
company sold its houses to workers in the 1980s,12 which had allowed
them to develop informal activities at home (opening a shop, raising
poultry, etc.), and, in turn, led to new economic disparities in the camp.
Some even managed to rent or sell all or part of their house to outsiders.
As newcomers came to live in the camps, they contributed to making
these spaces less homogeneous than they had been in the past. Nowa-
days the people that I met in Panda often say that they look after their
own business and avoid interacting too much with neighbours:
“When we were working at Gécamines”, one of them told me, “we
had a group savings system between neighbours here. Each month,
on pay day, we received bags of rice, bags of sugar, soap, all that was
needed for the household from the company. Each household in the
neighbourhood was giving a bag of rice to two families. It was good.
But for the moment, there is no way. When I’m here at home, I don’t
care about my neighbours. They are in their home, and I’m in mine. I
only know my house”
At the same time, spatial boundaries that marked sharp social dis-
tinctions in the past have lost much of their significance since the
1980s. Confronted with a general decline in their living conditions, all
GECAMINES employees had to fend for themselves to survive, and
those higher in the hierarchy were not necessarily better equipped than
others to carry out informal subistence activities on the side. Generally
speaking, GECAMINES camps lost their status of exception among
Congolese cities. Formerly a protected social category, their inhabitants
have become poorer than the rest of the urban population in the cop-
perbelt. Looking for money to feed their family, send their children to
school, or pay unexpected medial fees is now part of their daily ex-
perience, as it is for other Congolese people for more than three dec-
ades. A clear indication of this integration of former camps in Congolese
‘cityness’ has been the appearance of bars, private schools, or
Pentecostal churches within their boundaries – that is, places formerly
associated with the ‘cité’, the town.
In sum, the decline of GECAMINES not only caused the deteriora-
tion of camp infrastructures, but also took the tendencies that were
already at work to extremes, such as the withdrawal of the company
from camp management, the development of private services and in-
formal activities, and the decline of communal life. In these changes, it
is possible to see the re-appropriation of camp space by their in-
habitants, progressively leading to the de-totalization of coercive, bio-
political, and disciplinary strategies that operated through the camp in
the colonial period. The political rationality behind this abandonment
of camps to workers could be viewed as an expression of what J.-F.
Bayart called the ‘governmentality of the belly’ (Bayart, 1989a,b). It is
this mode of government, one might suggest, that led to the informal
privatization of the company, to the unravelling of its social policy, and
to the proliferation of ‘tactics’ among workers (De certeau, 1990). In the
GECAMINES camps, it introduced what Congolese people under the
Mobutu regime dubbed ‘article 15 of the Constitution’: ‘Débrouillez-
vous’.
8. New camps (2005–2017)
Following Joseph Kabila’s accession to power in 2001, the World
Bank came back to Congo to support the reconstruction of the economy,
devastated by years of war. The liberalization of the mining sector was
central to its strategy: It prescribed changes in the law to attract new
foreign investors and organized the restructuring of state-owned mining
companies. GECAMINES in particular was pushed to transfer mining
and industrial assets to new joint-venture projects with foreign private
companies. Following the rise in copper prices in 2004, investors of
various sizes and origins flocked to the copperbelt to snatch up the
company’s most promising assets. Ten years later, a dozen projects were
found in operation, producing a total of one million tons of copper (that
is, double GECAMINES’s production record in 1986), and three new
underground projects were in the development phase.
This multiplication of large-scale mining projects aroused strong
tensions with artisanal miners; it did not, however, result in the end of
small-scale mining in the copperbelt. On the contrary, the number of
artisanal miners continued to increase, leading to the development of
new mines and the construction of new processing plants. Although its
growth is more fragile and limited in the longer term, this production
chain remains firmly established in the Congolese mining landscape.
The enclave thesis discussed above points to broad changes that are
visible in the Congolese copperbelt: While new investors produce more
copper, they hire fewer (permanent) workers and contribute less to
national development; in return, their security apparatus around mines
and plants is more sophisticated. This line of analysis, however, fails to
account for the diversity of mining projects (they are developed by
investors of various sizes and origins, in diverse locations, through
different legal arrangements with GECAMINES, among others) and
their spatial effects. This limitation is clear if we look at the space of
workers’ camps. In accordance with the enclave thesis, most observers
of the mining boom in the copperbelt suggest that, in contrast to
GECAMINES in the past, mining companies do not build camps, hos-
pitals and schools for their workers. The reality on the ground is,
however, more complex. Taking the location of mine sites as a point of
departure, it is possible to distinguish three scenarios:
(1) The first is represented by mining projects located near large urban
centres. It includes projects like MMG and RUASHI MINING near
Lubumbashi or KCC, MUMI, and KAMOA-KAKULA near Kolwezi. In
this case, the employer simply builds camps (houses, a canteen, sport
facilities, etc.) for expatriates. On site, according to the project’s stage
of development, it is made of tents, containers or bungalows. In town,
expatriates are accommodated in brick houses inside a secure com-
pound. Congolese employees, on the other hand, have to find ac-
commodation themselves. In accordance with the law, they receive a
small housing allowance and can take a shuttle to the mine site every
day. Medical care for workers and their families – another legal re-
quirement – is subcontracted to private health centres.
(2) Another scenario is provided by mining projects (like BOSS MINING
or KINSENDA MINING) located far from large urban centres, but
close to former GECAMINES or SODIMIZA camps. A case in point is
BOSS MINING, near the former GECAMINES town of Kakanda,
200 km from Lubumbashi. Similar to the first scenario, the com-
pany built a new camp (bungalows, a canteen, bar and sport fa-
cilities) on site, but this is not exclusively for expatriates: Most re-
sidents are Congolese employees who come from Katanga’s major
cities for periods of five to ten days. In addition, BOSS MINING
rehabilitated and took over the management of GECAMINES
housing, hospital, and schools in Kakanda. Workers and their family
have a free access to these facilities.
11 According to Henk (1988), the theft of company property was already
common in the 1980s.
12 For women, this process of 'individualization' had begun in the 1960s with
the provision of running water in each household, and the desertion of foun-
tains and washtubs that resulted from it.
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(3) The last scenario is that of relatively remote mining projects. The
mining boom in the Congo has not led to the emergence of new
mining towns like Kalumbila where FQM built around 3000 houses
for rent and purchase, with all the modern amenities to ‘stabilize’ its
workers and families in this remote area of Zambia. Located at a
shorter distance from major cities, mining companies in the
Congolese copperbelt have opted for cheaper (and less risky) so-
lutions. FRONTIER, which bought the rights of a mine situated near
the small border town of Sakania to FQM, offers three options to its
employees: top managers can stay in a prefabricated camp on site
during the week, and return home in Lubumbashi or N’dola at the
weekends; other employees can choose between renting a house in
Sakania or in the camp that FQM has built on its outskirts. 320
households currently live in this camp, which consist of rows of
brick houses with small gardens and car parks. On the other hand,
there is no social infrastructure in the camp so that its inhabitants
have to go to town for schools, health centres and other facilities.
In addition to these workers’ camps, more provisional camps have
popped up near the artisanal mines. On the sites where artisanal miners
work independently, camps are made of tarp tents and include various
services (restaurants, brothels, shops, etc.). On sites run by small-scale
mining companies, the artisanal miners working for them as day la-
borers usually receive tents – or at least, the tarpaulin – from their
employer, who also look after the food supply. Built hastily with por-
table materials by a poor and mobile population, artisanal mining
camps usually do not follow any plans and are devoid of basic infra-
structure (running water, toilets, dumping site, etc.). By the forces of
circumstance, their existence is temporary: such camps last until the
mine can no longer be exploited with hand tools or is bought by a large-
scale mining company.
From these various scenarios, it can be inferred that the decision to
build camps and social infrastructure for workers (or taking up existing
ones) mostly depends on circumstances. Schematically it depends on
three factors: the relative proximity, or accessibility, of the mine from
large urban centres; the arrangement made between the foreign in-
vestor and GECAMINES; and, of course, the financial aspects of the
mining project. While small-scale mining companies are content with a
provisional solution, large-scale mining companies often make gradual
improvements to their camps. The decision is dependent upon the
availability of capital, the profitability of the project and future pro-
spects (some mining companies that had ambitious plans for their
camps backpedalled following the fall of copper prices and the growing
political instability in the country).
Generally speaking, mining companies in Congo today operate under
more precarious conditions than UMHK or GECAMINES in the past. Most
are listed companies that must pay dividends to shareholders in the short
run. Even though the state is, directly or indirectly, a minority partner in
nearly all projects, it does not offer the conditions of stability the former
regimes provided to the mining industry in the 20th century. And since
their rights cover a much smaller concession, they do not have the oppor-
tunity to change their mining strategy according to copper and cobalt prices
on the world market. It is this relative precariousness that pushed investors
to build provisional and rudimentary camps (no garden, no school, no shop,
etc.) to house their workers alone while on site. If these camps remain a
place where the employer develops various (control, disciplinary and bio-
political) strategies, the focus is almost exclusively on labour productivity. It
does not mean that mining companies no longer have a family policy but
that this policy is now disconnected from the spatial technology of the
camp: it is conducted by other means such as the payment of school al-
lowances for the workers’ children, the subcontracting of health care to
private centres, the management of wives’ complaints about the use of
workers’ money, etc. In short, corporate power strategies are no longer
concentrated in the single locus of the camp; they operate through more
flexible devices that entangle mining companies in multiple (local) spaces.
To a certain extent, although new camps are part of a different
labour regime, they show more parallels with the camps of UMHK in
the early 20th century than with those that characterized the heydays
of GECAMINES: built on a geometric pattern with temporary materials,
they temporarily house single workers; they leave little room for in-
timacy, aesthetics, and social life outside of work; and, independent of
the still-visible distinction between expatriates and nationals, the space
is not used to signal social or cultural hierarchies. I believe there are
good reasons for making this comparison. Similar to UMHK’s under-
lying rationale in its early stages, building barrack-like camps and
subjecting its residents to a strict work discipline appeared to new in-
vestors in the Copperbelt as the best option for mining projects in their
development phase when confronted with a precarious economic and
political environment.
9. Conclusion
To study the spatial government of mining companies in the
Congolese copperbelt, this article took the history of workers’ camps as
a starting point. In doing so, its aim was to revise the enclave analysis
by looking at more specific power strategies and historical changes –
those related to labour control and workers’ camps. What the genealogy
of workers’ camps retraced above shows is not so much the emergence
of a new capitalism breaking with the past, but a series of transfor-
mations over a century, each corresponding to the development, or re-
organization, of various power rationalities. Throughout this history,
mining companies have used camps as a spatial technology to govern
their workforce, and adapted their built form according to changing
political rationalities.
In a nutshell, over the 20th century, workers’ camps in the cop-
perbelt have witnessed a cumulation of coercive, biopolitical and dis-
ciplinary strategies, which was followed by a decumulation of these
strategies to the profit of the affirmation of the state’s sovereign power,
and of the camp residents’ tactics – the turning point being situated
between 1960 and 1975. Since the late 1990s, with the emergence of
new (temporary) camps, it could be argued that a recovery process took
shape, as if one cycle had ended and another was about to begin.
To be sure, the general shape of this movement cannot be under-
stood independently of the dynamics of global mining capitalism and,
more specifically, variations in copper prices on the world market. This
is obvious when the many parallels that the history I have outlined here
shows with that of mining camps on the other side of the border are
considered (see Mutale, 2004; Mususa, 2012). As the emergence of
company towns in the United States had resulted from the rise of large
mining corporations in the period between 1870 and 1930 (Schmitz,
1986), the development of workers’ camps in Northern Rhodesia and
the Belgian Congo from 1930 to 1960 corresponded to the growth of the
colonial mining industry, which had been sustained by the support of
big financial conglomerates and favourable economic conditions. The
gradual decline of camps between 1975 and 2000 coincided in turn
with the nationalization of mining companies and the decline of copper
prices on the world market. Finally, the building of new camps for a
decade or so stems from the redeployment of mining capitalism in the
global South and the boom of copper prices caused by growing Chinese
demand.
This approach centred on capitalism, however, remains insufficient
to account for changes in how the camps were built and governed. As
this article shows, such changes resulted above all from adaptation to
local constraints, in particular: (1) the availability of healthy, dis-
ciplined, and skilled workers near mine sites; and (2) state economic,
political, and social regulations and programs. If the role of workers has
been negligible in Congo, it was more important in Northern Rhodesia,
especially after the Second World War (Henderson, 1972; Parpart,
1983; Larmer, 2007), as workers organized to claim better living con-
ditions in the camps and won their case.
For the recent boom in mining investments, if a new cycle in the
history of workers’ camps seems about to start, it is because the
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conditions that led to the emergence of camps in the past have not
completely disappeared. Similar to the situation faced by UMHK at the
beginning of the 20th century, new mining projects established far from
major urban centres must attract and house their employees on site.
Like SODIMIZA in the late 1960s, they invest in a state that has in-
herited the social legislation developed by the Belgian colonizer in the
aftermath of World War II, and remains engaged in a modernization
project.13 Furthermore, if the new camps built by the new investors are
more temporary than those of UMHK and GECAMINES in the second
half of the 20th century, it is less because investors have developed a
distinct rationality, associated with the rise of a new capitalism, than
because they can rely on existing infrastructure (roads, schools, etc.)
and develop their activities in a more precarious environment.
While the analysis here is limited to Congo, it opens the possibility
of comparing processes of workers’ camps formation from below
(Bayart, 2008). In this perspective, the (un-)making of camps is un-
derstood as resulting from an adaptation of mining capitalism to local
conditions, and reflecting the development of various power rational-
ities and procedures for controlling the workforce. Such an approach
offers clues – I believe – for making sense of the similarities and con-
trasts that the history of workers’ camps in the Congolese copperbelt
show not only with that of camps in Zambia, but also of compounds in
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